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INTRODUCTION
Social mobility is the engine of the American Dream, and education is the
key to social mobility. Access to education is therefore, understandably, at the
heart of many movements, historical and modern, to improve social equality,
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and the standard of living for the poor.1 Indeed, in the nineteenth century, free,
public education was “one of the most characteristic of American institutions.”2
Throughout the twentieth century, the push for improved access to and quality
of education was a major social force.3 This drive, however, has become stalled
because the current movement of education adequacy lawsuits has been unable
to deliver on its promise to ensure a high-quality education for all children.
This article hypothesizes that the structure of current adequacy lawsuits is
partly to blame for the as-of-yet failure of the movement. In every case, the
plaintiffs have been either school districts or large classes of students, with the
former having been represented about four times more frequently.4 Not
surprisingly, the remedies requested and then ordered have been on the state or
district level, and no court has ordered a student-level remedy.5 The structure of
these suits is also ill-formed to provide actual improvements for plaintiff
children because the suits take too long and include remedies that are frequently
too vague, and because courts tolerate non-compliance from the state officials
charged with implementing the remedy. Therefore, a new, student-centered
structure is needed to give the adequacy movement a second wind for improving
the fate of at-risk students.
Part I reviews the history of educational social movements. Part II
elaborates on the problems in the structure of adequacy lawsuits. Part III
explores the legal basis for a private right of action for the inadequate provision
of educational opportunity under a state’s constitution and explains why such a
right has not previously been recognized: courts have concluded that there are
no judicially manageable standards for determining when an individual child’s
right has been denied.6
Part IV counters this objection by examining the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) as a model for determining when a student’s
rights are denied. Under the IDEA, students with disabilities are entitled to a
free, appropriate public education, which, as defined by the courts, is strikingly
similar to a sound, basic education or a minimally adequate education
guaranteed under many state constitutions.7 The IDEA provides reasonable
deference to educational authorities regarding the adequacy of the instructional
program offered along with judicial review of all aspects of that program.8
1. See, e.g., JANE ADDAMS, TWENTY YEARS AT HULL HOUSE 150 (Macmillan Co. 1912) (1910)
(explaining that one of the substantial achievements of Hull House was to show Chicago “that
education and recreation ought to be extended to immigrants”); Teach For America, Our Nation’s
Greatest Injustice, http://www.teachforamerica.org/mission/index.htm (last visited May 5, 2009)
(noting the commitment of more than 20,000 corps members to eliminating subpar academic
opportunities for children in low-income communities to achieve greater social justice).
2. WILLIAM J. REESE, AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: FROM THE COMMON SCHOOL TO “NO CHILD
LEFT BEHIND” 45 (2005) (quoting R.W. DALE, IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA (1878)).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 56–66 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part III.B. Courts have also cited separation of powers concerns and the potential
flood of litigation coming from recognition of such a right, but the lack of manageable standards is
the most frequently cited reason for denying recognition.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See infra Part IV.A.
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Importantly, the IDEA also includes a broad selection of remedies, ranging from
a revised educational program to compensatory services such as tutoring or
additional years of schooling, to tuition at private or out-of-district public
schools.9 Finally, Part V argues for recognition of a private right of action. After
justifying the right of action as an appropriate student-level remedy, this part
evaluates the benefits and disadvantages of allowing a private right of action.
I. HISTORY OF EDUCATION MOVEMENTS
Three broad social movements in education chart the centrality of education
to social mobility through U.S. history to greater and lesser degrees of success:
the common school movement, desegregation, and education adequacy. The
common school movement began around 1837 when Horace Mann became the
first state secretary of education in Massachusetts.10 Mann was instrumental in
pushing for free, locally funded schools offering grades one through eight,
starting in Boston and reaching throughout Massachusetts.11 In 1852,
Massachusetts became the first state with a compulsory school attendance law,12
thus transforming education from an option to an obligation for the state’s
children.13 The movement spread nationwide and school attendance rates rose
steadily over the next century. By the early 1900s, most children were receiving
at least a few years of free education.14 The common school movement was
largely a success: throughout the twentieth century proportionally more
American children attended high school than children in any other country,15
and locally maintained, free, public schools became the norm by mid-century.16
The success of the common school movement, however, illuminated the
problems of segregation in southern schools.17 In the early twentieth century,
schools for black children had only a fraction of the resources white children’s
schools did.18 For example, in 1930, South Carolina spent eight times as much per
pupil for white children’s education as for black children’s; in 1929, the ratio in
Mississippi was nine to one.19 While improving the education of black children
9. REESE, supra note 2, at 45.
10. Id. at 10–11.
11. Id.
12. Compulsory Attendance Act of 1852, 1852 Mass. Acts 240, §§ 1–2, 4.
13. REESE, supra note 2, at 10–11.
14. See Claudia Goldin, The Human-Capital Century and American Leadership: Virtues of the Past, 61
J. ECON. HIST. 263, 266 (2001).
15. JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCORVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 19 (2003).
16. See Goldin, supra note 14, at 265 (noting the virtues of American education as “public
funding, openness, gender neutrality, local (and also state) control, separation of church and state,
and an academic curriculum”); id. at 267 (explaining that by the end of World War II, the median 18year-old American was a recent high school graduate).
17. See REESE, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining how, simultaneous to the rise in common schools in
the North, laws against educating slaves became commonplace in the South). Segregation or
exclusion of blacks from public schools was not, however, an exclusively southern phenomenon. See
id. at 73 (explaining that blacks were often excluded from rural schools in the Midwest and that many
urban schools in the North were segregated).
18. DIANE RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION 1945–1980 121 (1983).
19. Id.
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was certainly not the only, if even the primary, goal of desegregation
proponents,20 there can be little doubt that it had just that effect.21 Between 1970
and 1988, the gap in reading scores between white and black students decreased
by about half.22 During that time period, the percentage of black students
attending schools with nearly all minority enrollments reached its lowest level to
date.23 Similarly, intradistrict discrepancies in class size and funding between
schools decreased dramatically.24 Although some researchers attribute the
closing test score gap to increased parity in parental education,25 the rise in
educational attainment by black parents is also related to desegregation efforts
that opened high schools and colleges to blacks, as well as to affirmative action
programs that helped them gain admission. Even critics of the view that
desegregation policy has substantial impact on the test score gap admit that
likely alternative causes are increased access of minority students to advanced
classes, decreased discrimination by teachers, and higher expectations for black
students.26 Certainly, such changes were not mandated by courts the way busing
was, but they are part of the social change created, at least in part, by the judicial
pronouncements against racial separation.27
As the promise of the Equal Protection Clause to achieve substantially equal
educational opportunity through desegregation waned,28 a third movement
began. Like the common school movement of the prior century, the push for
educational adequacy was directed at the least advantaged children in society,29

20. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 365 (rev. ed. 2004) (recounting Thurgood Marshall’s
closing argument in the South Carolina desegregation case, Briggs v. Elliott, noting that segregation,
as an injustice, caused “lasting, not temporary, injury” to the students); see also id. at 380 (noting that
some advocates thought black students may be better educated in segregated schools where black
teachers cared deeply about their success).
21. Note that whether students perform better in integrated classrooms or schools is an entirely
different question from whether the end to separate school systems and the accompanying changes in
schools improved the educational outcomes of minority students. As to the former question, there is
indeed substantial doubt. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 187 (2004).
22. Michael D. Cook & William N. Evans, Families or Schools? Explaining the Convergence in White
and Black Academic Performance, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 729, 729–30 (2000). From 1973–1990, the gap in math
scores decreased by a similar proportion. Id.
23. CLOTFELTER, supra note 21, at 56 tbl 2.1.
24. Cook & Evans, supra note 22, at 730–31.
25. David Armor, Why Is Black Educational Achievement Rising?, PUB. INT., Sept. 1992, at 65, 66.
26. Cook & Evans, supra note 22, at 750.
27. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal.”).
28. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a cross-district
busing plan designed to remedy metropolitan segregation).
29. Compare REESE, supra note 2, at 11 (explaining the motives for the common school
movement), with William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas
Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 219 (1990) (noting
that school financing lawsuits are motivated by a desire to improve education for disadvantaged
students).
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yet focused rhetorically on universal standards.30 The drive for educational
adequacy began in California in the early 1970s when a group of school children
filed a class action suit against the state superintendent of public instruction
challenging the unequal funding of schools.31 The movement for improving
educational opportunity through constitutional litigation hit a significant speed
bump in 1973 when the Supreme Court, in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez,32 upheld large disparities in local education funding under rational
basis review after finding that education is not a fundamental right and that
poverty is not a suspect classification.33
State constitutions, however, are flush with education articles that require
the establishment of common schools or mandate the provision of basic
education in one form or another.34 Between 1971 and 2007, lawsuits based on
these articles were filed in forty-five states35 and have focused on two lines of
argument: equality and adequacy.36 Equality claims, often based on a state’s
equal protection clause, focus on the substantial disparities in per pupil funding
between wealthy and poor districts whereas adequacy claims, based on a state’s
education clause, focus on the quality of the education provided regardless of
disparities.37
Adequacy claims have been more successful.38 Challengers have emerged
victorious in twenty-five states39 and obtained favorable settlements in four
more.40 In Minnesota,41 Nebraska,42 South Dakota,43 and Wisconsin44 courts

30. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212–13 (Ky. 1989) (noting that
the state’s constitution guaranteed all children the right to an adequate education that prepared them
for future employment and citizenship).
31. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971). Although the California
Supreme Court’s decision in Serrano rested on the federal Equal Protection Clause, the court later
affirmed the outcome and the reasoning as applied to the California Equal Protection Clause after the
United States Supreme Court interpreted the federal clause in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976).
32. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
33. Id. at 35.
34. See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP.
L. REV. 1325, 1343–48 (1992) (cataloging state constitutional provisions).
35. William S. Koski, Ensuring an “Adequate” Education for Our Nation’s Youth: How Can We
Overcome the Barriers?, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 14 (2007).
36. Thro, supra note 29, at 225, 233.
37. Id. at 229–33.
38. See Nat’l Access Network, State by State, http://www.schoolfunding.info/
states/state_by_state.php3 (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) (explaining the outcomes in all school finance
cases).
39. Sonja Ralston Elder, Note, School Financing Lawsuits: The Way out of the Fog or Just Blowing
Smoke?, EDUC. L. & POL’Y F., Nov. 2007, at 5 tbl.1, http://www.educationlawconsortium.org/forum/
2007/papers/Ralston2007.pdf [hereinafter School Financing Lawsuits]. Because state constitutions,
state laws, and state courts are all different, of course, it is important to remember that a victory in
one state does not have exactly the same meaning as a victory in another state. Despite these
differences though, there are substantial similarities in the holdings of the courts and the challenges
faced by children which makes comparisons, while undoubtedly broad, helpful.
40. See Nat’l Access Network, supra note 38 (explaining settlements in Colorado, Indiana, Iowa,
and North Dakota).
41. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993).
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found that the state constitution guaranteed some level of adequate education
but that the state’s current system already met the required level. In some cases,
defeat in court was not the end of the story. In Oklahoma, the legislature raised
taxes to fund smaller class sizes and higher teachers’ salaries after education
advocates sued in the late 1980s even though the state had prevailed in court.45 In
Florida, after the state supreme court declared that the state constitution did not
require educational adequacy, in part because there were no judicially
manageable standards,46 the voters passed an amendment to the state
constitution making it very clear just how fundamental a right they thought
education was. 47
Unlike the two prior movements for educational opportunity, the adequacy
movement has been less successful thus far in translating legal and policy
victories into educational ones.48 For example, in several states where courts have
recognized the unconstitutionality of the current funding system, the judges
have yet to order specific remedies or enforce mandates for legislatively created
ones.49 Although it is also true that many courts tasked with implementing
desegregation were hesitant at first to order or enforce drastic remedies,50 they
were eventually spurred by the Supreme Court to be more aggressive51 in a way
that cannot52 and will not53 happen in adequacy cases. Along with reticent
legislatures, there is evidence that the adequacy movement has not created
significant improvements for students that would parallel the gains of the 1970s

42. Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993) (upholding the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment because the plaintiffs failed to allege that differential funding led to inadequate education).
43. See Nat’l Access Network, supra note 38 (describing the trial court’s decision in Bezdicheck v.
State in 1994).
44. Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396–97 (Wis. 2000).
45. Nat’l Access Network, supra note 38.
46. Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996).
47. The first sentence of the education article now reads, “The education of children is a
fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida.” FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
48. See Elder, supra note 39, at 2 (explaining that students’ test scores in states with victorious
lawsuits have not improved significantly more than those in other states).
49. See Sonja Ralston Elder, Note, Standing up to Legislative Bullies: Separation of Powers, State
Courts, and Educational Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 755, 785–90 (2007) [hereinafter Standing up to Legislative
Bullies].
50. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1971) (noting that
between 1954 and 1968 “very little progress had been made” in integrating schools, in part, because
the lower federal courts encountered “problems” in designing and enforcing remedies).
51. See id. at 15 (noting that “the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies”).
52. Because state high courts have final authority to interpret state constitutions, the Supreme
Court may not broaden the scope of state courts’ powers to remedy state constitutional wrongs.
Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.”).
53. The Supreme Court has become increasingly less interested in enforcing educational rights.
See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1990) (holding that once a school district has reached
unitary status, the district court’s authority to review the school district’s student assignment policies
must end); cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that a student’s race may be a factor in student assignment only as
“a last resort to achieve a compelling interest”).
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and 80s.54 Combining this lack of improvement with the lack of enthusiasm for
judicial management of schools, it is likely that, without something more, the
adequacy movement will wither and die before achieving substantial
improvements in the educational opportunities of at-risk children.
II. ADEQUACY LAWSUITS ARE POORLY STRUCTURED
As a means of ensuring that each child’s right to an adequate education is
vindicated, educational adequacy and school financing lawsuits are poorly
structured. The lawsuits have been focused on the macrolevel rather than the
microlevel, resulting in judgments that take years to enforce and have few, if any,
trickle-down benefits for individual students in need of better educational
opportunities.
Educational adequacy or school financing lawsuits have been brought in
forty-five states.55 In more than 80 percent of these cases, a school district or
nonprofit organization was a named plaintiff.56 In the remaining eight cases in

54. Compare School Financing Lawsuits, supra note 39, at 2 (noting the lack of dramatic
improvement in the black-white achievement gap due to financing lawsuits), with Cook & Evans,
supra note 22, at 730 (explaining that the black-white achievement gap narrowed substantially from
the early 1970s through the mid-1980s).
55. Nat’l Access Network, supra note 38.
56. See Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (an advisory opinion
upholding the decision in Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt); Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756 Civ.
(Alaska Super. Ct. filed Aug. 9, 2004) (plaintiffs include three school districts); Roosevelt Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Lake View Sch. Dist., No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91
S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002); Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla.
1996); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1997); Comm. for Educ.
Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); Lake Cent. v. State, No. 56 C01-8704-CP81 (Ind. 1987);
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Charlet v. Legislature, 713 So. 2d 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (plaintiffs included
six New Orleans parishes and the Orleans Parish School Board); Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm’r,
659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Durant
v. State, 566 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. 1997) (plaintiffs included fifty-one school districts from Schmidt v.
State (Docket No. 132677) because the cases were consolidated); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299
(Minn. 1993) (plaintiffs included fifty-two school districts); Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878
S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1994); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989);
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, CV-98014II (N.M. Dist. Ct., McKinley County Oct. 14, 1999), https://repository.unm.edu/dspace/bitstream/
1928/6859/1/ReportSpaecialMasterZuniPubSch.Jan.15%2c2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009);
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006); Hoke County v. State, 599
S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994); DeRolph
v. State 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (plaintiffs included five school districts); Fair Sch. Fin. Council v.
State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Coal. for Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991);
Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979) (plaintiff was the Philadelphia School District); City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535
(S.C. 1999); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997) (plaintiffs
included two school districts); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994) (plaintiffs included
seven school boards); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Vincent v. Voight, 614
N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000) (plaintiffs included school districts); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907
P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995); Coal. for a Common Cents Solution v. State (Iowa 2002),
http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/legal_docs/Iowa/Coalition__v_Iowa_StateDistrict
Cou.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009) (case settled shortly after being filed); South Dakota Legislative
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which all plaintiffs were individual students, the suits were filed as57 or treated
as58 class actions rather than individual suits. This structure is unsurprising
considering how expensive lawsuits can be, particularly when expert witnesses
and multiple appeals will be required.59 School districts, due to their institutional
capacity, have more available resources, frequently including lawyers on staff.
The real problem arises during the remedy phase of the case where the
individual child’s interest in receiving an adequate education immediately, and
the school district’s interest in self-preservation and promotion or the nonprofit’s
interest in fixing the system as a whole, diverge. In every successful case, the
original remedy has been to order the state legislature to reform the school
financing statute to provide equalized or increased funds at the district level.60
Yet there is seldom discussion of the wisdom or efficacy of giving more money to
the entity that ultimately has been unable to provide the adequate education in
the past. And indeed, the strategy has yet to prove effective: between 1992 and
2005 there was no statistically significant difference in the improvement in
student achievement between states with adequacy victories and those without.61
The questionable efficacy of the monetary remedy implicates an ongoing
debate in the educational community about whether money matters in
education.62 Researchers like Eric Hanushek argue that educational outcomes are
largely independent of financial inputs.63 His methods, however, have been
sharply critiqued by other researchers in the field.64 The truth likely lies

Research Council,
Issue Memorandum
94-39, http://legis.state.sd.us/ IssueMemos/
IssueMemos/im94-39.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009) (describing Bezdichek v. South Dakota, CIV 91209 (S.D. 1994) (plaintiffs were school districts)).
57. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,
859 (W. Va. 1979).
58. Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Colo. 1982) (analyzing whether
plaintiffs or those “similarly situated” were denied equal protection); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267,
1272–73 (Conn. 1996) (examining facts at the level of the school district rather than the specific
situations of any of the sixteen individual plaintiffs); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 157–60 (Ga.
1981) (analyzing data on the district level); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615
N.E.2d 516, 549 (Mass. 1993) (examining the structure of school districts in Massachusetts to
determine if the constitution was followed); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Neb. 1993) (analyzing
data on the district level even though the case had only two plaintiffs, who were siblings); Abbott v.
Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 420–21 (N.J. 1997) (analyzing the statute as it applied to the districts not the
students).
59. For example, in 1997, the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the award of more than $3
million in legal expenses to plaintiffs in a school financing case. James v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 713 So.
2d 937, 950 (Ala. 1997).
60. E.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997) (ordering the legislature to devise an
entirely new system of education financing with an eye towards how such a system impacts
discrepancies among districts).
61. Elder, supra note 39, at 2. To isolate the effects of the lawsuits on student achievement
growth, this study controlled for growth in per capita income, growth in per pupil spending, prior
per pupil spending, and the proportion of education spending provided by the state. Id. at 6.
62. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MAKING MONEY MATTER: FINANCING AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 38–39
(Helen F. Ladd & Janet S. Hansen eds., 1999).
63. E.g., Eric A. Hanushek, Assessing the Effects of School Resources on Student Performance: An
Update, 19 EDUC. EVAL. & POL’Y ANAL. 141, 141 (1997).
64. E.g., Alan B. Krueger, Understanding the Magnitude and Effect of Class Size on Student
Achievement, in THE CLASS SIZE DEBATE (Lawrence Mishel & Richard Rothstein eds., 2002) (critiquing
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somewhere in the middle: adequate funds are a necessary but insufficient part of
providing quality education.65 Although researchers have yet to discover the
elusive magic formula for educating all students,66 some inputs recur frequently
enough in studies on quality to conclude that they really do matter.
For example, studies frequently cite effective or high-quality teachers as the
most important input in student learning.67 Teacher quality is indeed one of the
most significant measurable differences between high-income and low-income
schools and between white and nonwhite schools.68 Experienced teachers
consistently flee low-achieving, low-income, and, most notably, minority
majority schools for greener pastures.69 High turnover among teachers creates
problems in addition to those associated with simply having less-experienced
and less-qualified teachers: the school becomes unstable, teacher training and
development suffers because there are no experienced teachers to be mentors or
they are worn out from doing it year after year, and budgets must be spent on
recruiting new teachers instead of improving the school or buying instructional
materials.70 Lower teacher salaries and poorer working conditions are also
associated with low-achieving schools.71 Yet no court has enforced a requirement
that every child receive an effective teacher.72
In more circuitous fashion, many courts have commissioned studies or
relied on studies commissioned by governors that analyze how much it would

Hanushek’s “vote counting” methodology for over counting weaker studies and misrepresenting the
consensus of research).
65. See Richard J. Murnane & Frank Levy, Evidence from Fifteen Schools in Austin, Texas, in DOES
MONEY MATTER? THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND ADULT SUCCESS
93, 93–96 (Gary Burtless ed., 1996) (exploring the impact of increased funds in fifteen schools and
finding that only two schools—those which used the money to improve teacher training and
instruction—saw significant gains in achievement).
66. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 18 (“Figuring out how to improve learning
for all students is an evolving story.”); see also RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 61–83
(2004) (explaining that even successful interventions for disadvantaged students are not perfectly
replicable).
67. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 210–11 (cataloging studies that show the
positive impact of high-quality teachers on student achievement).
68. See Susana Loeb, John Luczack, & Linda Darling-Hammond, How Teaching Conditions Predict
Teacher Turnover in California Schools, 80 PEABODY J. EDUC. 44, 48–49 (2005) (explaining the perils for
students who are taught by inexperienced and under-qualified teachers for several years in a row and
that such conditions are more likely to occur at high-poverty, high-minority schools).
69. Id. at 45. Minority majority schools are those where a majority of the student body is
comprised of students of color.
70. Id. at 48–49.
71. Id. at 49 (finding that students in schools with high teacher turnover “experience a number of
negative consequences” and learn less than they should); id. at 49, 51 (finding that schools with high
turnover rates have higher rates of new and inexperienced teachers, whose salaries are comparatively
low); id. at 65 (finding that working conditions are a substantial predictor of teacher turnover).
72. North Carolina has come the closest. In 2004, the state supreme court upheld the trial court’s
determination that a sound basic education includes “‘every classroom be[ing] staffed with a
competent, certified, well-trained teacher.’” Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 389
(N.C. 2004) (quoting the trial court’s order). Yet, even in this case, no sanctions have been applied to
schools that continue to use uncertified teachers or long-term substitutes, a still-common occurrence
in many rural classrooms.
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cost to provide a quality education.73 These costing-out studies seek to divine
how much a good education costs by one of four methods: statistical analysis,
effective schools, professional judgment, and whole-school design.74 The first
method utilizes econometrics to identify numerous variables and analyze the
impact of each variable through statistical models.75 Statistical analysis, however,
is highly complex and difficult for policymakers (and judges) to understand; it is
also limited by the difficulty of quantifying all the relevant variables.76 Perhaps
the most serious flaw of this method is that it relies, in theory, on the existence of
an education production function—a magic formula—which likely does not
exist.77 The second method identifies successful or effective schools that have
high achieving students and low costs and deems their per pupil expenditures
“adequate.”78 The effective schools method was used in Ohio and Illinois, but it
fails to control adequately for differences in student statuses such as disability,
poverty, and speaking English as a second language, as well as cost of living and
other geographic differences.79 The third method, professional judgment, selects
a panel of experts who construct an ideal instructional delivery system and then
assigns a cost to each of the components of that system.80 This method was used
in Wyoming, and is likely no less precise than the others, although the process is
less transparent and the results depend greatly on which experts are chosen.81
The final method, whole-school design, takes off-the-shelf blueprints for model
schools and determines the cost for implementing them.82 This is likely the
weakest method because none of the available designs are research tested or
verified.83
Additionally, each method suffers from the need to make adjustments for
the type of students in a given school and the local cost of resources.84 In a study
for the state of New York, Standard & Poor’s used a common weighting system
to adjust the results of its effective schools approach: students with disabilities
were counted as 2.1 students, English-language learners as 1.2, and economically
disadvantaged students as 1.35.85 Geographic adjustments are more complicated
but also possible—and necessary: no one disputes that everything is more
expensive in Manhattan than it is in Albany.86

73. E.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53–56 (N.Y. 2006).
74. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 114.
75. Id. at 115–16.
76. Id. at 117 (examples of variables that are hard to measure or hard to include in models
because they are not currently measured include students’ social skills, work readiness, and
appreciation for cultural diversity).
77. Id. at 117–18.
78. Id. at 118.
79. Id. at 120.
80. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 121.
81. Id. at 122–23.
82. Id. at 123.
83. Id. at 124.
84. Id. at 124–25.
85. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50, 54 (N.Y. 2006).
86. See id. at 54–55.
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The most serious flaw with each of these methods is that they fail to account
for the labor market effects of changes in demand for the most costly resource:
effective teachers. Effective teachers are not a commodity whose price is
unaffected by supply and demand: as more schools demand effective teachers,
each school will no longer be able to purchase a sufficient quantity at the prehigh-demand price. That is, just because a school could hire one effective teacher
for $40,000 today it does not follow that every school in the state could staff itself
exclusively with effective teachers for $40,000 a piece. These models, therefore,
will underpredict the amount of money needed, resulting in insufficient funds
even if the plan is fully enacted, which it rarely is.87
Another reason these lawsuits are failing the children they aim to help is
that they simply take too long. The North Carolina Supreme Court first
recognized the right to education in 1997.88 In 2007, the case was still active on
remand.89 In Ohio, the state supreme court held the school funding system
inadequate in 1997,90 but later abandoned the case without any significant
changes having been made.91 In New Jersey, the ordeal has dragged on for more
than three decades without resolve.92 Other states have similar stories.93 By the
time the remedy is implemented, if it ever is, the children who were the subjects
of the suit, like Robb Leandro in North Carolina, have grown up without the
adequate education to which they were entitled.94
This is reminiscent of the fight for desegregation in which it took nearly ten
years for southern schools to make measurable progress on integration.95 Just like
Robb Leandro, the children of Clarendon County, South Carolina, plaintiffs in
Briggs v. South Carolina never attended integrated schools, and Linda Brown
attended an integrated high school for a mere two years even though she was
only seven when Brown v. Board of Education began.96 Much of the progress that
did come in desegregation likely was prompted by the federal government

87. See, e.g., Standing up to Legislative Bullies, supra note 49, at 791–92 (explaining that while the
N.Y. Court of Appeals ordered the state to increase spending for N.Y.C. public schools by $1.9 billion
annually, the actual increase approved by the legislature was only about $900 million).
88. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997).
89. See Rick Martinez, Schools Change at a Snail’s Pace, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 19,
2007, at A13.
90. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
91. See Standing up to Legislative Bullies, supra note 49, at 785–86 (explaining the DeRolph line of
cases and the lack of change to the status quo ante).
92. See id. at 786–89.
93. See Nat’l Access Network, supra note 38 (cataloging the ongoing battles over education
equity and adequacy in all fifty states).
94. Indeed, the lead plaintiff in the North Carolina lawsuit, Robb Leandro, was a high school
student when the case was filed and is now an attorney at the firm that is handling the case on
remand. Parker Poe, Attorney Profile, Robb A. Leandro, http://www.parkerpoe.com/attorneys/
bios.cfm?id=485 (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
95. CLOTFELTER, supra note 21, at 24, 26 (explaining that in 1959 only 0.2% of black students in
the South attended school with whites but by 1972 only 25% attended schools that were more than
90% black).
96. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, MSN ENCARTA, http://encarta.msn.com/
encyclopedia _761588641/Brown_v_Board_of_Education_of_Topeka.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2007).
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through the Civil Rights Act of 196497 and the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965,98 which tied federal funding for schools to progress on
integration.99 In contrast, it is unlikely that Congress will step in to ensure
adequacy.
The recent federal effort to improve educational quality, the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB),100 is rhetorically bold, but falls far short of providing
sufficient resources and guidance to substantially improve education for
disadvantaged students.101 Like school financing lawsuits, NCLB is focused at
the school level: schools must make adequate yearly progress for each subgroup
of students and face sanctions if they fall short.102 Individual students, however,
are left with few remedies under the law. They are allowed to transfer to other
schools, but only if those schools are not in need of improvement and are in the
same school district, conditions that are rarely met at all and certainly not in the
numbers necessary to provide alternatives for all students in struggling
schools.103 NCLB, like most federal education efforts, is critically underfunded.104
Additionally, the law creates incentives for states to lower their standards,
shuffle low-performing minority students among schools to avoid having to
count their scores, and encourage truly struggling children to drop out
altogether.105
Adequacy lawsuits have been on the scene in serious numbers for more
than two decades, yet in 2007, eighth graders eligible for the free and reducedprice lunch program scored three-quarters of a standard deviation below their
more affluent peers in math and reading on the National Assessment of
Educational Progress.106 This means that seventy-seven percent of non-poor
students score higher than the average poor student. These gaps are the same as
in 1996.107 Clearly, something is not working.

97. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
section of the 42 U.S.C.).
98. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
99. CLOTFELTER, supra note 21, at 26.
100. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6300 et seq. (2006).
101. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932,
932–34 (2004).
102. Id. at 940.
103. Id. at 966–67. In many parts of the country, school districts are geographically small and
relatively homogeneous in achievement, so a failing school is overwhelmingly likely to be part of a
failing district. Id.
104. See, e.g., David J. Hoff, Debate Grows on True Costs of School Law, EDUC. WK., Feb. 4, 2004, at 1.
105. Ryan, supra note 101, at 934.
106. Inst. for Educ. Sci., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., http://www.nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/nde
(last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (click on “Quick Start,” agree to the terms, select radio buttons for “Grade
8” and either “Mathematics” or “Reading,” click on “National,” and then select “National Public,”
select “Natl School Lunch Prog eligibility,” click on “Go to Results,” on the next page, select “average
scale score with standard deviation”).
107. Id. (follow the same instructions, except select “all years available” on the criteria selection
page to get results from 1996).
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III. THE LEGALITY OF THE RIGHT OF ACTION
The case for the private right of action for inadequate educational
opportunity under a state’s constitution is a simple one: the right belongs to the
student who therefore deserves the opportunity to seek individualized
enforcement of that right rather than rely on a third party to do so on his or her
behalf. First, this part includes a discussion establishing the constitutional,
common law, or statutory basis for the private right of action, which differs
based on the state. Next follows a discussion examining why such a right has not
already been recognized.
A. The Basis for the Private Right of Action
The private right of action could be based in one of three areas: the state
constitution itself, a state statute providing for the remedy of constitutional
violations, or common law principles. Twenty-seven states have direct
constitutional provisions guaranteeing access to the courts, unbiased justice, and
remedy by due course of law.108 At least one state court judge has found that
such a provision gives plaintiffs the ability to assert their state constitutional
rights in court.109 These provisions essentially make the state constitution selfenforcing and thus plaintiffs may bring their educational rights claims by
pleading directly for enforcement of the state’s constitution.110 Second, federal
statutory law provides a model for many state laws, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows
citizens to initiate suits at law or in equity to recover when their federal civil and
constitutional rights have been violated “under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage” of a state.111 Many states have similar provisions
allowing suits when state constitutional rights have been violated.112 Because
educational rights are state constitutional rights, suits seeking to enforce those
rights fit squarely within the parameters of these civil rights statutes.
Third, the common law provides an analogy for a private right of action for
constitutional violations through the similar implied rights of action recognized
for the enforcement of statutes. In 1975, through the case Cort v. Ash, the
Supreme Court laid out a four-factor test for determining if a federal statute
implied a private right of action.113 The factors were: 1) whether the plaintiff is a
member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; 2) legislative
intent; 3) consistency with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and

108. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art 1, § 19.
109. Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993) (White, J., dissenting in part) (calling
plaintiff’s right to be heard in court “readily apparent”). While courts in forty-five states have heard
challenges to school financing statutes on constitutional grounds, few of those decisions explain
under what statute or provision plaintiffs properly stated their claims. But, the same route that
provides a school district with third-party standing and a cause of action in those suits should
provide a cause of action to an individual plaintiff.
110. Id.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
112. E.g., 16-123-105 ARK. CODE (Weil 2007) (mirroring the language of § 1983); accord NEB. REV.
STAT. § 20-148 (2007).
113. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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4) whether the cause of action is traditionally relegated to state law.114 Many state
courts apply a version of the Cort test.115 In 2001, the Supreme Court abandoned
that test, holding in Alexander v. Sandoval that private rights of action “must be
created by Congress.”116 The Court’s reasoning was based largely on the fact that
while “[r]aising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be
a proper function for common-law courts,” it is inappropriate for federal courts
that do not have common law powers.117 Because state courts, unlike federal
courts, are common law courts, the states that followed Cort have not yet
followed Sandoval and their Cort-style tests remain good law.
For example, West Virginia uses a nearly identical four-factor test where the
first three factors are the same as in Cort and the fourth inquires as to whether
the private right of action would intrude on an area of exclusively federal law.118
In another variation, Illinois courts consider whether:
(1) the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was
enacted, 2) it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute, (3)
plaintiff’s injury is one the Act was designed to prevent, and (4) it is
necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute.119

Kansas courts apply a similar two-part test considering whether 1) the
statute was designed “to protect a specific group of people rather than . . . the
general public,” and 2) the private right of action was intended by the
legislature.120 In contrast, Arizona courts assume a private right of action exists
unless the legislature has shown explicit intent to prohibit it.121
Collectively, then, there are six possible factors: 1) whether the right inures
to a specific class of which the plaintiff is a member; 2) whether the injury in
question is the type the provision was designed to prevent; 3) whether the issue
is preempted by federal law; 4) whether the cause of action is consistent with the
purpose of the provision; 5) whether the cause of action is necessary to remedy
the violations; and 6) the intent of the drafters or the purpose of the act.
In applying these tests to the right to adequate educational opportunity,
some factors are easier than others. First, as free public education is only
available to schoolchildren, education articles in state constitutions are aimed at a
particular class: children. In fact, some articles specifically mention children as
the benefactors of the right.122 Individual students would be members of that

114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Noyola v. Bd. of Educ., 688 N.E.2d 81, 85 (Ill. 1997).
116. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
117. Id. at 287 (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
118. United Steelworkers v. Tri-State Greyhound Park, 364 S.E.2d 257,260 (W. Va. 1987).
119. Noyola, 688 N.E.2d at 85.
120. Nichols v. Kan. Pol. Action Comm., 11 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Kan. 2000).
121. Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668, 672 (Ariz. 1994).
122. See N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“A uniform system of free public schools sufficient for the
education of, and open to, all the children of school age in the state shall be established and
maintained.”); VT. CONST. § 68 (requiring that “a competent number of schools ought to be
maintained in each town . . . for the convenient instruction of youth”); WASH. CONST. art IX, § 1 (“It is
the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of the children . . . .”).

Ralston_cxns.doc (Do Not Delete)

6/23/2009 1:38:37 PM

ENFORCING PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS

151

class. Second, because education is a positive right, the inadequate provision of
educational opportunity is precisely the harm that providing a right to education
is designed to prevent.123 Third, education is not an area of law delegated to the
federal government.124 Fourth, allowing a private right of action is consistent
with the purpose of a state’s education clause if the constitutional provision is
designed to ensure the provision of an adequate education and if the cause of
action is a means of ensuring such provision in practice.125 Fifth, the question of
whether such a cause of action is necessary to remedy violations of the right is a
factual inquiry that could be supported by substantial evidence that other
remedies have proven insufficient. Sixth, the intent of the drafters is the most
difficult factor to apply as it is historically unclear whether private rights of
action for enforcement of constitutional rights were even cognizable to the
drafters of state constitutions. This difficulty, however, should not stop state
courts from undertaking the analysis.
B. Why Courts Do Not Already Recognize the Right
In the past, students and their parents have attempted to sue school districts
for personal remedies under two different theories: educational malpractice and
constitutional claims for vouchers. In nearly every instance, the cases have been
dismissed at the pleadings stage because the courts were unwilling to delve into
the policy problems of adjudicating such cases.126
The first educational malpractice case surfaced in 1976 when an eighteenyear-old high school graduate sued his school district for failing to teach him to
read above the fifth-grade level.127 The court dismissed his negligence claim
because he failed to establish that the school district owed him a duty.128 It stated,
“[u]nlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom methodology
affords no readily acceptable standards of care, cause, or injury.”129 The court
also cited policy concerns about the potential flood of litigation that would

123. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1999) (explaining that positive rights are those that entitle persons to
receive some benefit from the government and that such rights are common in state constitutions).
124. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 5 (“Education is not mentioned in the federal
Constitution and therefore has been viewed as a power reserved to the states . . . .”).
125. E.g., Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So.2d 107, 173 (Ala. 1993) (explaining that the
legislative history of the state’s education clause shows that the clause was designed to “accord[]
schoolchildren of the state the right to a quality education that is generous in its provision and that
meets minimum standards of adequacy”).
126. See Greg D. Andres, Comment, Private School Voucher Remedies in Education Cases, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 795, 803 (1995) (discussing both of the cases in which students sued for vouchers and the cases
were dismissed); Kimberly Walters-Parker, Note, When Students Pass, but Schools Fail: The Negligent
Failure to Teach Students to Read, EDUC. L. & POL’Y F., Nov. 2007, at 11–12, http://
www.educationlawconsortium.org/forum/2007/papers/Walters-Patker2007.pdf (sic) (last visited
Mar. 17, 2009) (cataloging educational malpractice suits and their high rate of dismissal).
127. See Walters-Parker, supra note 126, at 11–12 (relating the factual background of Peter W. v.
San Francisco Unified School District, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App. 1976)).
128. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Ct. App. 1976).
129. Id. at 860.
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follow recognition of educational malpractice as a cause of action.130 The Peter W.
court’s reasoning has been recurrent in subsequent educational malpractice
cases,131 none of which have been successful.132
In 1992, the Washington, D.C.-based Institute for Justice filed two
lawsuits—one in Chicago and the other in Los Angeles—seeking vouchers for
students attending poorly performing, low-income, inner-city schools, which
were alleged to be violating each state’s constitution.133 Both state courts
dismissed the cases, finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action or
request relief within the court’s power to grant.134 The Illinois court opined that
even if it were to recognize that the schools are constitutionally inadequate,
vouchers were a “political question that should be decided in the public
arena.”135 Similarly, the California court found that decisions about the allocation
of school funds were for the legislature.136
In sum, courts’ concerns come down to three areas, none of which should be
persuasive: separation of powers, the flood of litigation, and the lack of judicially
manageable standards. The first objection fundamentally misunderstands the
separation of powers doctrine.137 First of all, the separation of powers doctrine
developed in the federal courts on the basis of Article III’s structural delegation
of power to the courts and the overall structure of the federal Constitution.138 As
such, it is not wholly, and perhaps not even partially, applicable to state courts
interpreting state constitutions.139 In contrast to federal constitutional rights,
which are largely negative in structure,140 many state constitutional rights,
including the right to education, are positively structured.141 The amount of
judicial intervention required to enforce and uphold positive rights is greater
than that required to enforce negative ones because injunctions alone usually will
not suffice.142 By including these positive rights, state constitutions “explicitly
engage state courts in substantive areas that have historically been outside the
Article III domain”143 by requiring “state court[s] to share explicitly in public
governance, engaging in the principled dialogue that commentators traditionally

130. Id. at 861 (noting that recognizing such a claim would “expose [schools] to the tort claims—
real or imagined—of disaffected students and parents in countless numbers”).
131. Walters-Parker, supra note 126, at 12.
132. Id. at 3. This article tracks cases through 2006. Id. The author was unable to locate any
additional cases post-dating this analysis.
133. Press Release, Institute for Justice, “Voucher” Remedy Sought for Low-Income Parents in
Major Lawsuits Filed against Chicago and Los Angeles Public Schools (June 9, 1992), http://
www.ij.org/schoolchoice/chicago/6_9_92pr.html.
134. Andres, supra note 126, at 796 nn.2–3.
135. Jenkins v. Leininger, No. 92 CH 05578, slip op. at 14 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County Mar. 30, 1993).
136. Andres, supra note 126, at 803.
137. Standing up to Legislatice Bullies, supra note 49 (discussing the misunderstandings of the
separation of powers doctrine).
138. Id. at 759.
139. Id. at 759–60.
140. Id. at 760.
141. Id. at 760–61.
142. Id. at 761.
143. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1890 (2001).

Ralston_cxns.doc (Do Not Delete)

6/23/2009 1:38:37 PM

ENFORCING PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS

153

associate with the common law resolution of social and economic issues.”144
Furthermore, nearly all state courts are common law courts whose business it is
to craft as well as to apply the law.145 Therefore, state courts enforcing state
constitutional rights should not be preoccupied with the separation of powers.146
Second, although recognition of the private right of action would open the
courthouse doors to more litigation, courts are unlikely to be flooded.147
Furthermore, as Justice Harlan noted in a similar context, “[t]here is, however,
something ultimately self-defeating about this argument.”148 It is true that
judicial resources are stretched thin.149 But lawyers will lack the incentive to
bring numerous suits in which the possibility of recovery is speculative, so
concerns about a flood of frivolous lawsuits are unfounded.150 And if the suits
brought are meritorious, it is counterintuitive to decrease access to the courts for
those claimants who have been most wronged.151 For example, a company
should not be allowed to escape accountability through litigation because it
manufactured a product that killed many people rather than merely a few.
Indeed, the opposite is true: when a defendant has wronged a large number of
people, the need for deterrence through civil judgment is at its highest.152
Moreover, a wholesale closing of the courthouse doors represents a value
judgment on the part of the judiciary as to which types of claims and legally
protected interests are important and which are not.153 Certainly the rights of
impoverished children are just as important as those of traffic accident victims
and “stockholders defrauded by misleading proxies.”154 The “current limitations
upon the effective functioning of the courts arising from budgetary inadequacies
should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise

144. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (1999).
145. Standing up to Legislative Bullies, supra note 49, at 762–63.
146. Id. at 760.
147. See Walters-Parker, supra note 126, at 13–14 (explaining that while many courts have cited the
“flood of litigation” rationale for denying educational malpractice claims, no court has presented
evidence to support this claim); see also infra Part IV.C (explaining the obstacles to litigation that
would prevent a flood of lawsuits).
148. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining why fears of a flood of litigation were insufficient
to persuade him that individuals should not have a right of action for damages against federal agents
for violations of their constitutional rights).
149. See, e.g., Tyeesha Dixon, Courts Short of Timeliness Goals, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 3, 2007, at 1B
(noting that most of Maryland’s courts fell short of 2001 goals to complete civil cases in eighteen
months and criminal cases in six months due to overcrowding of the docket).
150. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410.
151. Id.
152. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS §12 (4th ed. 1971) (“It is the
business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a ‘flood of litigation,’
and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such
grounds.”).
153. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411.
154. Id. at 410; see also id. (explaining that if damages are available for at least the “most flagrant
abuses of official power,” the issue of whether damages should be available in any given case is
resolved by reference to how important the social value upheld by the law in question is).
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sound constitutional principles.”155 Regardless of how frequently individuals
actually seek relief in court, “it is important, in a civilized society, that the
judicial branch of the Nation’s government stand ready to afford a remedy in
these circumstances.”156 Part IV deals with the third argument regarding
judicially manageable standards by presenting a model of manageable
standards.
IV. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT AS A MODEL
In 1975, Congress first passed the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act157 (EAHCA) that guaranteed every U.S. child access to the public schools or
to be otherwise provided with educational opportunities.158 Before the enactment
of the EAHCA, eight million children with disabilities were not receiving
accessible instruction, including one million children who were excluded from
public schools all together.159 In 1990, Congress substantially amended the law,
retitling it the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).160 The IDEA,
in both its original and amended forms, provides students with disabilities with
procedural and substantive rights to education and has been effectively enforced
by state and federal courts for more than three decades. As such, it provides an
apt model for a more generalized private right of action to enforce the existing
state constitutional rights to an adequate education. Section A provides an
overview of the law and its function; section B elaborates on the fit between the
IDEA and state constitutional rights; section C examines the practical aspects of
the proposed private right of action.
A. What the IDEA Is and How It Works
From the beginning, the EAHCA aimed to provide each eligible child with a
“free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs.”161 To achieve this goal, the
EAHCA required schools to create individualized education programs (IEPs) for
each student that included the student’s current level of performance and annual
goals, the specific program to be provided, and criteria for evaluation.162 To
protect the child’s right, it provided parents with the right to be involved in the
process of developing the IEP,163 to access the child’s records,164 to receive an
independent evaluation of the child’s needs,165 and to submit complaints.166

155. Id. at 411.
156. Id.
157. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et. seq. (2006)).
158. Id. § 3(a), 89 Stat. at 775 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2006)).
159. Id. § 3(a), 89 Stat at 774.
160. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2006) (stating that “this chapter may be cited as the ‘Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act’”).
161. Id. § 1400(d)(1).
162. Id. § 1414(d).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 1415(b)(1).
165. Id.
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Complaints must be adjudicated in an impartial due process hearing and parents
may appeal the result of that hearing in a civil action in state or federal court.167
The 1990 amendments included requiring transition plans for students over
sixteen,168 implementing an evaluation program of the law,169 and perhaps most
importantly, requiring a waiver of state sovereign immunity for suits alleging
failure to comply with the IDEA.170 The IDEA makes clear that all remedies
available “at law or in equity” are open to plaintiffs against states and local
school boards171 alike172 and authorizes the recovery of attorneys’ fees for the
winning party.173
Although the IDEA is a statutory scheme, courts have been active in
developing its scope and implementation and have explicated or created many of
the details of its workings. Its definition of a free appropriate public education
(FAPE) “tends toward the cryptic rather than the comprehensive”174 and
required judicial clarification.175 In Board of Education v. Rowley, the Supreme
Court constructed a constrained definition of a FAPE, holding that the IDEA
does not require states to provide students with the “opportunity to achieve
[their] full potential.”176 A school provides a FAPE when it “provid[es]
personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to
benefit educationally from that instruction.”177 To satisfy the standard, however,
the educational benefit must be more than de minimis.178
The Supreme Court has also clarified procedural elements of the IDEA. For
example, in 2006, the Court held that although the IDEA authorizes the
prevailing party to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees, it does not entitle parents
to recover the costs of experts they used at trial.179 Additionally, as in nearly all
civil litigation, the plaintiffs, who are always the parents in IDEA cases, bear the
burden of persuasion180 even though the school, by virtue of being the
designated record-keeper under the statute, bears the burden of production.181

166. Id. § 1415(b)(6).
167. Id. § 1415(f).
168. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 602(a), 104
Stat. 1103, 1103–04 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) (2006)).
169. Id. § 203, 104 Stat. 1112 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1418 (2006)).
170. Id. § 604, 104 Stat. 1106 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1403 (2006)). Note that IDEA, as a
grant program to the states, is enacted under Congress’s spending power. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411.
171. The statutory text references local education agencies (LEAs), which are defined to include
school boards. 20 U.S.C. §1401(19)(A).
172. See id. § 1415 (referring consistently to “local education agency” or “state agency” as the
party responsible for complying with procedures and against whom redress may be sought).
173. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
174. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188 (1982).
175. See id. at 190.
176. Id. at 186 (quoting Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
177. Id. at 203.
178. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 1993).
179. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 (2006).
180. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005).
181. Id. at 53 (listing the statute’s requirement that schools provide parents with all records upon
request); see also id. at 56 (noting that the parties agreed that who bears the burden of production was
not in question).
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Finally, parents may proceed pro se in actions to enforce the IDEA requirements
because the statute provides rights to parents as well as to children.182
Courts have also been instrumental in defining the remedies available for
violations of the IDEA. Broadly, the statute authorizes a court to “grant such
relief as [it] determines is appropriate.”183 Courts may use their “broad
discretion,” taking into account “all relevant factors.”184 The Supreme Court has
upheld remedies for specific performance185 as well as monetary
compensation.186 Lower courts have also ordered a broad range of remedies from
sign language interpreters187 to enrollment at private, residential facilities.188 For
children with more minor disabilities like specific learning disabilities or mild
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, less drastic remedies like tutoring,
summer school, and additional years of instruction are common.189
In evaluating IDEA claims, the trial court should undertake a two-step
inquiry.190 The first step is determining whether the state complied with the
procedural requirements of the Act.191 The second step is evaluating whether the
child’s IEP is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits.”192 If the court finds the state lacking in the second area, it then
considers the parents’ proposed alternative placement to determine whether that
placement is “proper under the Act.”193 The alternative placement need not meet
all the same requirements as the placement proposed by the state,194 but it must
meet the basic “reasonably calculated” standard.195
The goal of the EAHCA/IDEA was to ensure disabled children the
opportunity to benefit from public education.196 With more than thirty years of
experience, the statute can be judged a success. Before the enactment of the
EAHCA, more than half of the nation’s eight million children with disabilities
were not receiving proper instruction, including one million who were excluded

182. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 534 (2007).
183. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (2006).
184. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 16 (1993).
185. See, e.g., Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) (requiring a school to
provide clean intermittent catheterization, a simple medical procedure, to a handicapped child in
school to enable her to remain in school).
186. Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (recognizing reimbursement of private
school tuition as an appropriate remedy for failure to provide a FAPE).
187. E.g., Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 114 (1st Cir. 2003).
188. E.g., Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1122 (2d Cir. 1997).
189. See, e.g., W.G. v. Bd. of Trs. of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1482 (9th Cir.
1992).
190. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 206–07.
193. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993). If the state has violated the
procedural requirements of the Act, the inquiry is more complex. Before evaluating the alternative
placement, the court must determine that the procedural violation resulted in a denial of educational
benefits. See, e.g., Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 764 (6th Cir. 2001).
194. Carter, 510 U.S. at 13.
195. Id. at 11.
196. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2006).
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from schools all together.197 In the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA, Congress
noted that the Act “has been successful in ensuring children with disabilities . . .
access to a free appropriate public education and in improving educational
results for children with disabilities.”198 Even though there have been thousands
of lawsuits filed under the IDEA over the past several decades,199 the fact that
millions of children have been helped by the law indicates that it effectively
leveraged the threat of litigation to ensure that every child’s rights are upheld.
This concept of effective leverage is not unique to the IDEA—indeed, the entire
American tort system rests on the principle of liability as a deterrent.200
The Supreme Court has been frank that the main way for schools to avoid
IDEA liability and being forced to reimburse parents for pricey private school
tuition is to simply “give the child a free appropriate public education in a public
setting.”201
B. The IDEA as a Model for a Private Right of Action in Education
Because courts routinely evaluate the adequacy of the educational program
offered in an IEP, IDEA litigation provides a model for establishing judicially
manageable standards for adjudicating the state constitutional right to education
in individual cases. This is true largely because the substantive standards are
similar. It is also not uncommon for state tort causes of action to be based, at least
in part, on the violation of a duty created by a federal statute or regulation, even
when there is no independent federal cause of action.202
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Kentucky became the first court to
thoroughly elaborate the substance of the right to education by laying out seven
areas in which children should attain proficiency:
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to
function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization;
(ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable
the student to make informed choices;
(iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and
nation;
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness;

197. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 3(a), 89 Stat 773,
774. This finding is no longer codified in the U.S.C., having been replaced by more current factual
findings. 20 U.S.C. § 1400.
198. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118
Stat. 2647, 2649 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3)).
199. See LEXIS, Federal and State Court Cases, Combined, search between January 1, 1990, and
December 31, 2007, with the terms “Individuals with Disabilities Education Act” at least five times
(returning 1,265 cases).
200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. c (1977).
201. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993).
202. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986).
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(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his
or her cultural and historical heritage;
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue
life work intelligently; and
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states,
in academics or in the job market.203

In subsequent years, the Rose decision has been cited by other states’ high
courts in determining the scope and content of their own state’s constitutional
right to education.204 Other state courts have laid out similar, although slightly
different, formulations of the right.205 Two aspects common to nearly all
formulations are 1) basic literacy and numeracy skills, and 2) skills necessary to
prepare the student for independent living and the job market.206
In a similar vein, a FAPE often consists of basic academic skills, life skills,
and job preparation.207 Part of the statutory definition of a FAPE is that the
education must “meet the standards of the State educational agency,”208 which
include basic academic skills. Additionally, the IDEA requires that the IEPs for
all students aged sixteen and older include a section on transitioning to life after
high school including a focus on “training, education, employment, and, where
appropriate, independent living skills.”209
One difference of note is that a FAPE is focused on the specific child’s
individual needs whereas the constitutional provisions are set forth in universal
terms. But there is reason to believe that the specialized learning needs of
children with certain developmental or cognitive disabilities are not that
different from the needs of children growing up in poverty—those most likely to

203. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212–13 (Ky. 1989).
204. E.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (citing the Rose
factors “as establishing general, aspirational guidelines for defining educational adequacy”); accord
McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993).
205. E.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (holding that a sound basic education
consists of “(1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English language and a sufficient
knowledge of fundamental mathematics and physical science to enable the student to function in a
complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient fundamental knowledge of geography, history,
and basic economic and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices with regard
to issues that affect the student personally or affect the student's community, state, and nation; (3)
sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to successfully engage in postsecondary education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable
the student to compete on an equal basis with others in further formal education or gainful
employment in contemporary society”).
206. See Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 406 (Wis. 2000) (“An equal opportunity for a sound
basic education is one that will equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them to succeed
economically and personally.”).
207. See, e.g., Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1988)
(discussing how the legislative history of EAHCA demonstrates the Act’s focus on fostering selfsufficiency and independence in handicapped children both to promote their dignity and because it is
a good investment in the nation’s future).
208. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(B) (2006).
209. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa).
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be denied a constitutionally adequate education.210 New research indicates that
children “from lower socioeconomic levels show brain physiology patterns
similar to someone who actually had damage in the frontal lobe,” with slower
reaction time to informational stimuli and hampered problem-solving skills.211
Not only are the aspirational terms of the rights embodied in state
constitutions similar to those in the IDEA, but the needs of the children to be
served under each scheme are also strikingly similar. Because the reasoning
employed by a court determining the statutory adequacy of an IEP could be
applied essentially unchanged by one determining the constitutional adequacy of
the child’s instructional program, the IDEA provides a solid model of judicially
manageable standards for the adjudication of a private right of action for
educational rights.
C. The Private Right of Action in Action
This section explores some of the more practical elements of the private
right of action. Although this section attempts to deal with some of the logistical
issues that will arise when individual educational adequacy cases are brought,
addressing these logistical issues is by no means the purpose of this piece. The
overarching goal here remains to provide a sound doctrinal foundation for
private suits and not to work out the details of individual cases. This is because
the details of tort law vary significantly by state so it is difficult to make uniform
statements about procedure, and also because the details are largely irrelevant to
the larger point. Whether private suits should go forward, both as a matter of
normative policy and of descriptive doctrine, has little to do with how long the
pleading period is or what defenses will be recognized. Nonetheless, because
practical objections can stand in the way of accepting the theoretical point, I
attempt to address some of the most common practical issues below. I address
these elements in three categories: pleadings, defenses, and potential alternatives
to court.
1. Pleadings
In educational rights suits, as in any civil suit, the plaintiff must select the
proper defendant, time the claim so that it is ripe, decide whether a class action is
an efficient way to press a claim, and meet the burden of proof. First, there are
two possible defendants in these suits: the state and the school district.212 The
state has the obligation to fulfill the constitutional right, whereas the district is
the entity that has failed to provide the adequate education and that holds the
210. See Mark M. Kishiyama et al., Socioeconomic Disparities Affect Prefrontal Function in Children, 21
J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE (forthcoming 2009) (explaining how the low-income environment can be
damaging to the neural development of children).
211. Press Release, Robert Sanders, Univ. Cal. Berkeley, EEGs Show Brain Differences Between
Poor and Rich Kids (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/
2008/12/02_cortex.shtml.
212. In some states, there is no choice to make. For example, in Hawaii, there are no local school
districts, only a state education agency. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., About Us, http://
doe.k12.hi.us/about/index.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2008). Also, in some other states school districts
are treated as an arm of the state. See, e.g., Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 253
(9th Cir. 1992) (“Under California law, school districts are agents of the state . . . .”).
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records needed to prove the case. Also, from a systemic point of view, suing
already cash-strapped school districts is somewhat counter-productive and will
only siphon funds away from other children in need. For these suits to function
as a lever for systemic change, the financial hurt must be felt at the state level
because it is the state, not the locality, that has the ability to raise additional
revenue.213 Therefore, it makes sense to sue both the local school district and the
state: the district is liable because they took on the state duty to educate by
accepting state funds and the state is liable either because the fulfillment of
constitutional rights cannot be delegated or because it failed to provide adequate
resources for the district to fulfill its commitment.
Second, education is a continuous process, which makes it difficult to know
when a claim accrues for the failure to educate. The remedies outlined above are
all compensatory and educational in nature and thus will have the greatest
impact for a child early on in his or her educational career. Defendants, however,
may argue that a claim is not ripe until the school has had every opportunity to
correct for the child’s underperformance. In borderline cases, ripeness will be
difficult to resolve. As a starting point, however, there are numerous cases that
could be brought alleging per se violations of educational rights based on
inadequate inputs. For example, a child who is not provided a certified, trained,
or otherwise qualified teacher would have a claim for inadequate provision of
education in the states where a high-quality teacher has been identified as a
component of the constitutional right.214 Furthermore, the IDEA can again serve
as a guide here: it requires a child’s progress be assessed annually and a new IEP
provided each year—each IEP can be challenged for its adequacy.215 Similarly,
states could treat each school year as a separate claim under the state
constitution. A shorter period might not provide the school long enough to
provide education or monitor the child’s progress. A longer period risks making
it difficult to determine what happened due to lost records and faded memories
as well as a compound effect of inadequate education.
Third, although I argue above that statewide class action suits are ill-suited
to serve children’s needs, genuine class actions or suits with multiple plaintiffs
could be beneficial to plaintiffs, defendants, and courts alike. Consider the
situation noted above where a child has an unqualified teacher. In a state where
this violates the rights of child A, it also violates the rights of child A’s
classmates. Were these twenty or thirty children to join together in a single
lawsuit, it would be easier for them to find counsel willing to take their case,
cheaper for the defendants to defend one case instead of many, and less strain on
the court system to hear the consolidated case. Unlike in the typical school
financing suits, this situation would satisfy the rules of class actions because the
facts, law, and defenses are all “common to the class.”216 When a class exists that

213. Low-wealth school districts often have no option to raise additional revenue because
property tax rates are capped by state law and the districts with the lowest tax bases are often already
taxing themselves at the highest tax rates. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 234–38.
214. E.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
215. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006).
216. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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meets the standards of the state’s class action rules, plaintiffs should able to
pursue their cases under those rules.
Finally, the burden of proof issue is relatively straightforward: as in a
typical civil action, the plaintiff would bear the burden of persuasion; that is,
they must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the school, district, or
state failed to fulfill its duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education.
But one small caveat to the general civil scheme seems in order: as in IDEA cases,
the school should bear the burden of production because it is the custodian of the
educational records at issue.217
2. Defenses
There are three particularly relevant defenses that might be raised in
educational adequacy suits. First, as in many lawsuits against a state
government, the defendants are likely to raise sovereign immunity as a complete
defense to monetary liability. There are two tactics plaintiffs can use to defeat
this objection. First, because sovereign immunity does not protect the state from
the judgment of liability but only from having to pay money damages, plaintiffs
can avoid sovereign immunity problems by asking for non-monetary remedies
such as specific performance.218 Some remedies, including those most important
in educational rights cases, like compensatory education, are considered nonmonetary even though they involve the state expending financial resources.219
Additionally, they can sue the state official responsible for protecting or ensuring
their constitutional rights, such as the state superintendent of public instruction
or the governor, rather than the state itself.220 Second, many states waive their
sovereign immunity protections for the purposes of enforcing state constitutional
rights through state statute221 or in the constitution itself.222 If the plaintiffs are in
a jurisdiction with such a statute, sovereign immunity will not be a valid defense.
The second category of defense likely to be raised in an educational rights
suit is contributory or comparative negligence.223 Because these suits are
essentially constitutional torts, this traditional tort defense is entirely proper.
Indeed, a state that can show it has offered a child a constitutionally adequate
education but the child failed to learn because, for example, he did not attend
school for much of the year, should not be liable. A trickier question arises
regarding whether it is the child or the parent whose comparative negligence the
217. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2006) (stating that parents have a right to examine all records
relating to their children); see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (noting that the parties and
the Court agreed that who bears the burden of production is not up for debate).
218. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974).
219. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289–90 (1977).
220. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
221. See, e.g., Stephen v. Denver, 659 P.2d 666, 667 (Colo. 1983) (explaining the Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act, which waives immunity for various types of torts).
222. E.g., ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 21 (“The legislature shall establish procedures for suits against
the State.”).
223. Most states now follow the comparative negligence doctrine under which a defendant will be
liable for damages in proportion to its share of the liability even if the plaintiff contributed to the
injury. Only Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia retain the
contributory negligence doctrine, which bars recovery when a plaintiff has contributed to his injury
in any way. 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 956 (2008).
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court should consider, an issue that may vary by state based on principles of
parental rights and state statutory law regarding truancy and other policies.
The third likely defense comes from the public duty doctrine. This doctrine
states that when the government owes a duty to the public in general, it is not
liable to any one individual for a breach of that duty.224 Originally developed to
protect the police from claims of negligent failure to arrest, the doctrine
expanded to cover all municipal functions such as fire protection, road
construction, and health and safety inspections of workplaces and restaurants.225
The doctrine is now one of state law and had largely fallen out of favor, but
remains valid in some states.226 Depending on how a state’s right to education is
framed, the public duty doctrine may seem to apply.227
Generally, the doctrine does not apply if the government owes a special
duty to the individual or if there is a special relationship between the individual
and the state.228 Both of these exceptions could apply in the educational rights
context. First, once a state court has determined that the right to education is an
individual right,229 it has established that the state owes a special duty to each
individual child. Second, a special relationship exists where the governmental
entity undertakes, for example, to protect the plaintiff.230 The doctrine is
designed to protect the government from liability towards those whose only
relationship with the government is as citizens.231 Students, however, are far
from strangers to their schools. Indeed, the government has undertaken a very
special relationship to the students: that of educator, caretaker, and de facto
parent.232 The failure to educate does create generalized harm to the community,
for example, in terms of a less prepared workforce and higher crime rates, but it
is not this generalized harm that individual education adequacy suits seek to
remedy. Rather, as in standing doctrine, it is the concrete and specific harm to the
individual student that, although generalized across a class of students, is unique

224. South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 402–03 (1855). See generally Shea Sullivan, Note,
City of Rome v. Jordan: Georgia is a Public Duty Doctrine Jurisdiction with No Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity - A Good “Call” by the Supreme Court, 45 MERCER L. REV. 533, 535–38 (1993).
225. E.g., Ryan Rich, Seeing Through the Smoke and Fog: Applying a Consistent Public Duty Doctrine in
North Carolina After Myers v. McGrady, 85 N.C.L. REV. 706, 711 (2007).
226. See id. at 708.
227. For example, a state whose constitution merely requires the legislature to provide a
“thorough and efficient system of common schools” might be one in which the public duty doctrine
would apply more readily than in a state whose constitution is more child-centered.
228. Rich, supra note 223, at 706.
229. See, e.g., Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 379 (N.C. 2004).
230. Courtney E. Nuttall, Comment, Matthews v. Pickett County: The Public Duty Doctrine and Its
Special Duty Exception in the Face of the Governmental Tort Liabilities Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 457, 466–67
(2000).
231. See id. (cataloging cases applying the doctrine to protect officers from liability when no
special relationship between the plaintiff and the government existed: when, for example, the police
failed to arrest a drunk driver who later injured the plaintiff).
232. E.g., Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 968 P.2d 522, 528 (Cal. 1998) (“The relationship
between school personnel and students is analogous in many ways to the relationship between
parents and their children. At common law, ‘[s]chool officials are said to stand in loco parentis, in the
place of parents, to their students, with similar powers and responsibilities.’” (citation omitted)).
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to them as students and not merely as citizens.233 For these reasons, although it is
likely to be raised by defendants, the public duty doctrine should not prohibit
students from recovering for violations of their educational rights.
3. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Disputes regarding many of the positive rights granted by state statutes,
such as entitlements, are initially resolved in administrative proceedings, with a
right of appeal to a traditional state court. The administrative system serves to
resolve disputes—especially those that are of a largely technical nature—more
quickly and less expensively than a traditional trial and is also generally more
accessible to the public and to self-representation. In fact, the IDEA allows states
to establish administrative procedures to resolve IEP disputes, 234 and all states
have done so. Administrative procedures also lessen the burdens on courts, thus
dampening the impact on the judiciary of any potential flood of litigation.
Currently, no administrative procedures exist for adjudicating individual claims
of inadequate provision of education because the cause of action itself has yet to
be recognized. There is, however, no apparent reason why educational rights
suits could not also be handled though an administrative process if states wished
to establish one for that purpose. Indeed, an administrative process that puts
expert analysts to work evaluating these claims quickly may well be the best way
to implement a system of adjudicating individual educational rights suits.
V. WHY A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION?
In light of the failures of the systemic approach described above, innovation
is required if children are to realize their rights. While parts III and IV discussed
the legal and practical aspects of a private right of action, this part explores the
theoretical justification for the right as well as the policy rationales that support
it. As an initial matter, I concede that it would be preferable for legislatures to
provide solutions to the problems of inadequate education. Legislatures have,
however, had several decades to get around to providing an adequate education
for all children. They have not done it. There is little reason to believe that this
will be drastically different in the future.235 If legislatures are unresponsive, and
children have a right236 that courts can effectuate,237 it makes little sense to deny
either the children or the courts the opportunity. After all, a right without a
remedy is no right at all.238

233. See Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 22–24 (1998) (holding that a generalized
grievance may still confer standing on individuals who have suffered a concrete and specific injury in
fact).
234. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1) (2006) (explaining the administrative hearing process).
235. See Standing up to Legislative Bullies, supra note 49, at 772–78 (discussing the political market
failures that explain why legislatures are unwilling or unable to provide adequate education for all
children).
236. See infra Part V.A.
237. See supra Parts III.B, IV.
238. See, e.g., Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. 612, 623 (1849) (“A legal right without a remedy would be an
anomaly in the law.”).
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A. The Right to an Adequate Education Is a Personal One
On their face, only four of the fifty state constitution education articles
mention the quality of education to be provided.239 Indeed, more than twentyfive percent of the state constitutions (fourteen) require only the basic
establishment and support of a free system of public schools.240 Of the remaining
thirty-two, about half modify the basic requirement of providing a public school
system with adjectives such as “thorough,”241 “efficient,”242 and “uniform,”243
whereas the others require legislatures to use “all means necessary,”244 or
“suitable means”245 to secure for their citizens the “advantages and opportunities
of education,”246 or to provide for the intellectual development of the people.247
On their texts, these constitutional provisions apply mainly to the
legislatures of the states, usually as a mandate that “the legislature shall”
maintain a school system.248 Understanding, however, that the logical
implication of mandating the provision of education is that those for whose
benefit it is mandated, i.e. the children of the state, have a right to receive it,
many courts have interpreted these provisions to grant fundamental rights to the
children of the state.249 Despite the substantial differences in the texts of the
constitutions and the differences in the scope of court-articulated rights, there is
little correlation between the explicit wording and the substantive right
recognized by a court. For example, the Illinois constitution explicitly references
quality,250 but the Illinois Supreme Court has held that evaluating whether a
quality education has been provided is beyond the province of the courts and
solely for the legislature.251 Conversely, although the Wyoming Constitution only
requires the legislature to “provide for the establishment and maintenance of a

239. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (“Adequate provision shall be made by law for a . . . high quality
system of free public schools . . . .”); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (requiring the state to provide “an efficient
system of high quality public educational institutions and services”); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3)
(mandating provision of “a basic system of free quality public . . . schools”); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(requiring the legislature to “ensure that an educational program of high quality is . . . maintained”);
see also Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 1325, 1343–48 (1992) (cataloging state constitutional provisions).
240. See CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS.
CONST. ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art VIII, § 2; MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a);
NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1;
S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; VT. CONST. § 68.
241. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
242. E.g., OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
243. E.g., IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1.
244. E.g., R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
245. E.g., ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
246. E.g., S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
247. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
248. See Hubsch, supra note 239, at 1329.
249. E.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 76 (Wash. 1978) (holding that the state
constitution “imposes a paramount duty upon the State which in turn creates a correlative right on
behalf of all children residing” in the state).
250. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
251. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189 (Ill. 1996).
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complete and uniform system of public instruction,”252 the Wyoming Supreme
Court interpreted this article as establishing a fundamental right to education253
and applies strict scrutiny to laws impacting the right.254 Similarly, state supreme
courts in California,255 Connecticut,256 Kentucky,257 Minnesota,258 North
Dakota,259 West Virginia,260 and Wisconsin261 have each held that education is a
fundamental right under their state’s constitution. In state constitutional law, as
in federal constitutional law, infringements upon and failures to fulfill
fundamental rights receive strict scrutiny from the courts rather than rational
basis review.262 By extension, therefore, if the right to education is fundamental,
the bar for proving a violation is lower.263
The North Carolina Supreme Court has gone the furthest of the state courts
in interpreting the right to education. The education article of the North Carolina
constitution is of the basic variety: “The General Assembly shall provide . . . for a
general and uniform system of free public schools.”264 Yet in 2004, the North
Carolina Supreme Court explained:
We read Leandro and our state Constitution, as argued by plaintiffs, as according
the right at issue to all children of North Carolina, regardless of their respective
ages or needs. Whether it be the infant Zoe, the toddler Riley, the preschooler
Nathaniel, the “at-risk” middle-schooler Jerome, or the not “at-risk” seventhgrader Louise, the constitutional right articulated in Leandro is vested in them
all.265

Washington has taken a similarly strong approach, labeling the right to
education “a true ‘right’ (an absolute)” that, unlike a fundamental right, may not
be infringed by the state—even for compelling reasons.266
Other states have recognized a personal right to education without holding
it to be fundamental. For example, the New York Constitution requires the bare
minimum: “the maintenance and support of a system of free common
schools.”267 Although the New York Court of Appeals has refused to label
education a fundamental right,268 that court has repeatedly recognized that the

252. WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
253. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1258 (Wyo. 1995).
254. Id. at 1266.
255. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976).
256. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977).
257. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989).
258. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993).
259. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994).
260. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W.Va. 1979).
261. Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000).
262. See, e.g., Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1266 (Wyo. 1995).
263. See id.; cf. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1187–88 (Kan. 1994) (noting that
under rational basis scrutiny “the constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective”).
264. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
265. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 379 (N.C. 2004).
266. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 92 n.13 (Wash. 1978).
267. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
268. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 668–69 (N.Y. 1995).
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state constitution establishes the right to an adequate education.269 Likewise, in
Arkansas, the supreme court has repeatedly determined that while education is
not a fundamental right, it is a constitutional right enforceable by the courts.270
Similar situations have occurred in Alabama,271 Kansas,272 Maryland,273
Massachusetts,274 Montana,275 Nebraska,276 New Hampshire,277 New Jersey,278
Ohio,279 Oregon,280 South Carolina,281 Texas,282 and Vermont.283
B. The Benefits Outweigh the Costs
Even if a private right of action is theoretically justified, the question of
whether it is sound policy must be answered. Although there are some
drawbacks to recognizing a private right of action for inadequate provision of
educational opportunity at the state level, the benefits are substantial.
First, perhaps the strongest benefit to an individual right of action would be
the speed with which students could receive remedies. If a child could receive a
transfer to another school or tutoring services within a year of filing a complaint,

269. Id. at 681 (Simons, J., dissenting) (“The majority apparently view the constitutional provision
as establishing an entitlement to receive an adequate education.”).
270. Lake View Sch. Dist., No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 492 (Ark. 2002) (reaffirming the
interpretation of the education clause in a prior case).
271. Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So.2d 107, 139 (Ala. 1993) (holding that education not
being a fundamental right “is no defense to a claim of constitutional infringement because individual
rights do not obtain only when the state believes that it can afford them”).
272. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1189–90 (Kan. 1994) (explaining that the
court refused to classify education as a fundamental right because of problems inhering in the strict
scrutiny test).
273. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 786 (Md. 1983).
274. McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993) (holding
that the state constitution creates a mandatory duty on the state to provide adequate education,
which may be enforced by citizens through the courts, but declining to find a fundamental right).
275. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 691 (Mont. 1989) (declining to
decide whether education is a fundamental right because the equal protection issue was not
dispositive on appeal).
276. Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Neb. 1993) (White, J., dissenting in part) (indicating that
the court had not decided whether education is a fundamental right because the plaintiff’s claim was
not properly pleaded).
277. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993) (labeling education “an
important, substantive right”).
278. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 286 (N.J. 1973).
279. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 740 n.5 (Ohio 1997) (declining to decide whether education
is a fundamental right but still declaring the state’s financing system unconstitutional).
280. Coal. for Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116, 124 (Or. 1991) (discussing the positive
nature of the right to education in Oregon).
281. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (holding that the state
constitution creates a duty on the state to provide adequate education, which may be enforced by
citizens through the courts, but declining to find a fundamental right).
282. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (holding the school
financing statute unconstitutional because it was not “efficient” and declining to decide whether
education is a fundamental right).
283. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 396 (Vt. 1997) (finding the state’s school funding statute to
violate rational basis scrutiny, making a determination of whether education is a fundamental right
unnecessary).
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he would be substantially better off than under the status quo where he must
wait a decade or more for some other entity to assert his rights and use new
funds to improve his education. Also, because much of the legal legwork has
already been accomplished in adequacy suits, individual suits should be able to
move forward at a fairly rapid pace—the individual plaintiff will not have to
spend years relitigating the existence of the basic right to education.
A second and related benefit would be that such suits would place the focus
of the law where it belongs: on children rather than on bureaucrats or nonprofit
organizations. Although it is true that nearly all children in public school receive
their education from school districts, the right to an adequate education does not
belong to the district. Justice is ill-served by pretending otherwise, because even
though this is a rhetorical nuance, rhetoric is powerful and can drive results.
A third range of benefits are those that would accrue to students other than
the plaintiff. Just as relatively few IDEA suits have incentivized school districts to
provide free appropriate public education to millions of students,284 the
constitutional suits envisioned here would serve as leverage for districts and
states to improve educational opportunities because failure to do so would carry
real (and very expensive) consequences. Additionally, judicial decisions ordering
elected officials to expend public resources on politically less-powerful groups
can be a particularly effective means of resolving the political market failures
that give rise to the dire conditions that precipitate the litigation. The judicial
decision provides political cover for the elected officials who can then act to
benefit the less-powerful group without fear of electoral reprisals.285 That is, the
court takes the heat, freeing the legislative and executive branches to solve the
problem on the wholesale level.286 When a district replaces an unqualified
teacher with an effective one, not only the child who initiated the suit benefits, all
of her classmates do as well.
The final category of benefits relates to the judicial process. First, by
borrowing from the IDEA standards as laid out above,287 judges would have a
ready-made set of rules on how to interpret educational claims made by students
and districts. This would reduce the burden on the justice system for handling
constitutional rights cases. Second and similarly, using the remedy framework of
the IDEA promotes flexibility in resolving cases. Just as some IDEA violations
are more severe than others, some constitutional violations are more egregious
than others and the full range of remedies familiar to the courts under the IDEA
offer an appropriate panoply of remedies. Finally, because these are state rights
enforced in state courts, there are “laboratories of democracy” benefits where
each state can learn from the experiences of its sister states to continually
improve the implementation of this right of action.
This plan, of course, is not without its drawbacks—most notably the cost of
lawsuits and the limit of appropriate placements available in the market. First,
lawsuits are a transaction cost and, as such, are economically undesirable.

284. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
285. Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance: A Cautionary Note, 25 CAP. U.
L. REV. 37, 49 (1996).
286. See id.
287. See supra Part IV.
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Although individual cases may not cost the millions of dollars education
adequacy suits have, they are still likely to be expensive. Because of the upfront
expense involved, the neediest children and their families may be unable to
afford to take advantage of this remedy. There is also the possibility that districts
and states will end up spending limited resources on legal rather than on
educational services.288 The threat of expensive litigation, however, is a key
component of the leverage that could make private suits for educational
adequacy just as effective as IDEA suits have been.
A critical limitation of the effectiveness of the private right of action is the
quantity of available remedies. Spaces in high-performing public, private, and
charter schools are limited as are available tutoring and summer school services.
This shortage could create short-term disruptions in the ability of courts to order
and enforce effective remedies. Comparing figures for children with disabilities
(those served by the IDEA) and children in poverty (those most likely to be
served by private rights of action), however, indicate that there is not much
difference: nationally, about eleven percent of students have a diagnosed
disability289 and about eighteen percent of children live in poverty.290 Just as not
all children with disabilities are ill-served by their current public placements, not
all children in poverty are ill-served either.291
The broader benefit to the private right of action is that, in contrast to an
across-the-board legislative solution, it provides for incremental change. It will
take time for high-performing public and private schools to expand their
capacity to take students who are victorious in courts, and it will take time for
the teaching labor market to respond to higher salaries by producing higher
quality teachers. But, by starting slowly, with a few suits a year—as will
inevitably be the case as parents, advocates, and courts adapt to a new cause of
action—these suits can send the appropriate signals to the labor and educational
markets, which can then respond accordingly. Essentially, a response to the lagtime for implementation is built into the process and the availability of remedies
should not be a long-term issue.

288. Cf. Nanette Asimov, Extra-special Education at Public Expense, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 2006, at A1
(cataloging numerous IDEA suits including a district’s $239,044 in legal expenses to successfully
defend its position that the student did not require horseback riding and swimming therapies). One
key difference between IDEA and the right to an adequate education is likely the affluence of the
prospective plaintiffs: under IDEA many of the most expensive cases are pursued by relatively
wealthy families seeking relatively posh private placements for their children. See id. Because
children in high-wealth school districts where relatively wealthier families are most likely to live
likely, although not assuredly, already receive constitutionally adequate educations, they are unlikely
to become a large proportion of the plaintiffs the suits envisioned here.
289. U.S. CENSUS, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: JULY 26 (July 19, 2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_
editions/006841.html. This figure does not include children whose disabilities are not yet diagnosed.
290. U.S. CENSUS, AM. CMTY. SURVEY, SELECTED ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2007,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lan
g=en&_ts= (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (click on “Data Profiles”).
291. See DOUGLAS REEVES, ACCOUNTABILITY IN ACTION: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEARNING
ORGANIZATIONS 185–96 (2000) (documenting “90/90/90” schools: those with 90% minority students,
90% poor students, and 90% pass rates on state tests).
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Some may also argue that schools are not entirely to blame for some
children’s failure to learn; this is certainly true as numerous nonschool factors
impact a child’s success.292 Nonschool factors like low parental involvement,
however, will not be present in private right of action cases because only
involved parents will bring suits, and such concerns are not significant enough to
undercut the benefits such causes of action can bring to involved families.
A final criticism is that the justifications outlined above are ultimately
beside the point because courts that rely on a lack of judicially manageable
standards293 merely do so rhetorically and have entirely distinct substantive
reasons for their holdings. This criticism comes in two forms: first, judicial
complaints about the lack of standards are merely cover for the true, and nonjudicial, reasons for the courts’ decisions; second, a lack of manageable standards
is a court’s way of articulating more generalized concerns with the difficulty of
implementing positive rights. If the former, one can only guess as to what a
court’s true motivations might be, but the political heat of the issue and potential
electoral repercussions are possibilities. As already noted, the fact that
majoritarian legislatures have not already enacted policies that effectuate the
goal of adequate education shows that such a goal is not a political priority.294
Additionally, because nearly all state court judges face some form of electoral or
legislative review,295 is it also logical for them to be concerned about how their
decisions will impact their job security. There is only one response to this
criticism: it is a judge’s job to answer to the constitution—not to the electorate—
and if a state’s constitution requires the enforcement of unpopular (and
expensive) rights, it is the judge’s obligation to require that enforcement. If
judges are unwilling to see themselves as different from legislatures, then our
system of government has larger problems than inadequate education for needy
children.
If discussions of manageable standards stand for the latter concern
regarding the difficulty of implementing positive rights, a court may correctly be
wary of entering the foray of positive rights: such rights can be difficult to define,
violations challenging to detect, and enforcement lengthy and arduous. But it
should reassure courts that they enforce positive rights all the time, they are just
usually in statutory rather than constitutional form. Indeed, the modern welfare
state is brimming with positive rights such as income support for the disabled
and the elderly,296 medical support for the poor297 and veterans,298 and rights to

292. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND
EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 19–45 (2004) (documenting
non-school factors like parental involvement and access to quality health care that affect students’
success).
293. See supra Part III.B.
294. See Standing up to Legislative Bullies, supra note 49, at 772–78.
295. Id. at 766.
296. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (2006).
297. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (2006) (setting forth the eligibility and
funding requirements of Medicaid).
298. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (2006) (detailing the various health and medical benefits to
which veterans are entitled).
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social services such as those provided in the IDEA.299 Furthermore, courts are
successful in implementing positive constitutional rights, such as the right to
counsel in criminal proceedings.300 Critics may complain that each of these
examples is manageable because the right is provided only for a subset of the
population (i.e., the disabled, the elderly, the poor, veterans, criminal defendants,
etc.), and for logistical and financial reasons, such limitations might be necessary
to make the rights functional. The right to an adequate education, however, is
also demographically limited: it only applies to children, bringing it in line with
the scope of other, well-recognized positive rights.
In any case, by providing a response to the courts’ proffered reasoning, this
piece seeks to move the dialogue forward. If courts can no longer rely on the lack
of manageable standards as rhetorical cover for their decisions because that
reasoning has been undercut, they may be more candid in the future regarding
their true motivations, thus fostering greater dialogue among the branches of
government and between government and the people regarding policy priorities
and fundamental values.
CONCLUSION
Over two centuries, the experiment of United States public education has
grown by leaps and bounds, served millions of students, spurred economic
prosperity, and helped heal our cultural divisions. In the twenty-first century,
the future of public education remains an open book as the nation is confronted
with the hard realities of inadequacy that plague too many schools
disproportionately populated by students of color. As in the past, the courts have
the opportunity to push society forward and fulfill the promises of state
constitutions by recognizing a private right of action that enforces the right to an
adequate education. Social mobility is the engine of the American Dream, and
education is the key to social mobility. The question is now: will every child be
given a key?

299. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (2006).
300. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1962) (holding that the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution requires defendants be provided with counsel in felony proceedings).

